During the past three months, in light of the continued fighting, public criticism of the Hamas government and leadership has increased significantly in the Gaza Strip compared to the protests in the first months. The expanding activities of the IDF forces in Khan Yunis, Gaza City and the central Gaza Strip, the continuation of IDF and Israeli Air Force attacks throughout the Gaza Strip, the increase in the number of casualties and the heavy damage caused to infrastructure and buildings, the lack of food, the plight of the residents, especially the displaced persons, as well as the discourse about a military operation in Rafah, brought residents into the streets to demonstrate against Hamas.

At the protest demonstrations, which are mostly held during the day, for the most part Gazans express their anger at their situation and at senior Hamas officials, especially Isma’il Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, and Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip. The demonstrations highlight the growing frustration and despair among the Gazans living under the Hamas administration. They are angry at having to pay the price of the war while senior Hamas officials live in luxury in hotels abroad, while those who are in the Strip hide in tunnels. Most of the protesters call for the overthrow of the Hamas government and emphasize their desire to live a life of self-respect and support their families with dignity.

An analysis of the demonstrations indicates that currently they are local and sporadic, apparently organized spontaneously. They are not held particularly frequently, only a few per month, and are attended by a few hundred people. Apparently Hamas is not trying to stop them, possibly because it does not currently regard them as endangering its status. Furthermore, Hamas [falsely] claims that most of the demonstrations do not represent the feelings of the population and are fabricated or directed by Israel.

Meanwhile, because of the complaints, Hamas is clearly making attempts to correct the situation. For example, in response to complaints about the high price of food, the Hamas ministry of the interior appointed committees to monitor prices and prevent price gouging. The committees’ operatives examine prices, mainly in Rafah, where the majority of the population is concentrated, and masked, walk in the streets armed with clubs and guns, and supervise the markets.

Criticisms are also posted on the social networks. However, at the moment there are relatively few threads, managed by a handful of people with a limited number of followers. Criticism deals mainly with two topics: harsh criticism of the conduct of senior Hamas officials inside and outside the Gaza Strip, and a description of the Gazan population’s appalling situation.

So far, the number the protests is small and they do not endanger the Hamas administration. However, as time passes and Israel’s military pressure increases in the Gaza Strip, and as a result the humanitarian crisis worsens and the lack of food and shelter for the residents increases, the protests will continue and most likely increase. It is also possible that the approaching month of Ramadan, which begins on March 11, 2024, will further increase the public’s sense of want and its frustration, and therefore the extent of the protests.